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Blind quantum computation is an appealing use of quantum information technology because it can conceal
both the client’s data and the algorithm itself from the server. However, problems need to be solved in the
practical use of blind quantum computation and fault-tolerance is a major challenge. On an example circuit,
the computational cost measured in T gates executed by the client is 97 times more than performing the
original computation directly, without using the server, even before applying error correction. (The client
still benefits due to drastically reduced memory requirements.) Broadbent et al. proposed running error cor-
rection over blind computation, but our first protocol applies one layer of Steane’s [[7,1,3]] code underneath
instead. This protocol has better fault tolerance, but still results in a substantial overhead. We propose an-
other protocol to reduce the client’s computational load by transferring the qubit preparation to the server.
For each logical qubit used in the computation, the client is only required to receive eight logical qubits
via teleportation then buffer two logical qubits before returning one. This protocol also protects the client’s
fault-tolerant preparation of logical qubits from a side-channel attack.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Quantum computation shows great potential for solving some important problems
faster than classical computation [Mosca 2008; Bacon and van Dam 2010; Kassal et al.
2011; Jones et al. 2012b]. However, a practical quantum computer needs to be large
enough to handle sufficient numbers of delicate qubits, perhaps extending into the high
millions or low billions of physical qubits [Van Meter et al. 2010; Jones et al. 2012a].
Large-scale quantum “mainframes” will be valuable resources, and time-sharing of
machines will be economically attractive. Time-sharing quantum cloud services will
allow owners of smaller quantum computers to perform large quantum computations.
Sometimes the input and output data are private and even the choice of quantum
computing algorithm may be sensitive information, so this information has to be kept
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secret even from the server. Universal blind quantum computation is a powerful tech-
nique that can let the client do a quantum computation on a server without revealing
any information about the computation except an upper bound on the size [Broadbent
et al. 2009], akin to classical homomorphic encryption but with a much more tractable
performance penalty relative to an unencrypted computation.
Universal blind quantum computation makes use of a special feature of
measurement-based quantum computation [Raussendorf and Briegel 2001;
Raussendorf et al. 2003] which allows a quantum computation to be divided into
quantum operations and classical computations. Measurement-based quantum
computation uses entangled qubits as resources and the computation is performed
only by a sequence of measurements. The type of measurements determines the
quantum operation on the output qubits. In blind quantum computation, the client
prepares qubits and decides the type of measurements while the server does most
of the quantum operations. The inputs are encrypted in the qubits prepared by the
client, and the measurements are also encrypted so that they are independent of the
real computation. Thus, from the server’s point of view, all the received quantum and
classical information appears random. Blind quantum computation with four qubits
was experimentally demonstrated in 2012 [Barz et al. 2012].
A practical blind quantum computing system requires the ability to operate in the
presence of errors. Errors may occur during preparation of qubits, computation, and
transmission the qubits because of imperfect computing devices or a noisy transmis-
sion channel. Broadbent et al. suggested doing a fault-tolerant quantum computation
as a target computation in their scheme. The error correction itself, including syn-
drome measurement and corrections, would be performed as a blind computation, ne-
cessitating enormous amounts of low-latency, near-real-time classical communication.
It also require a teleportation rate sufficient to support real-time quantum error correc-
tion, rendering the scheme effectively impossible. However, in this scheme, quantum
error correction is only applied to the server. If the client and the server are connected
by a long and noisy channel, or more likely a quantum repeater network [Du¨r et al.
1999; Gisin and Thew 2007; Kimble 2008; Van Meter 2012], it will be hard to correct
the errors after the server receives the qubits. Blind quantum computation will be lim-
ited to using in a short range. Thus, we suggest applying quantum error correction to
the client, too, and applying it underneath the blinding protocol.
Based on Broadbent et al.’s approach, we propose our first fault-tolerant blind quan-
tum computation protocol, which uses a quantum error correction code and fault-
tolerant quantum circuits. The client has to do fault-tolerant quantum computation
to prepare logical qubits encoded with a quantum error correction code, and the server
has to conduct fault-tolerant entanglements and measurements on the encoded logical
qubits. Compared to Broadbent et al.’s fault-tolerant protocol, our first protocol pro-
vides a better fault-tolerant capability because errors that occur during qubit prepa-
ration and teleportation can be corrected. In addition, their fault-tolerant protocol ap-
plies quantum error correction on top of the basic blind quantum computation, while
our fault-tolerant protocol applies quantum error correction underneath the basic blind
quantum computation. In comparison to Broadbent et al.’s basic blind quantum com-
putation protocol, the number of qubits used in our first fault-tolerant protocol is in-
creased by a constant factor, while the number of qubits used in their fault-tolerant
protocol has a linear growth. A major drawback of our first fault-tolerant protocol is
that the client is required to do a lot of quantum computations for the fault-tolerant
preparation of encoded logical qubits. Since the client is assumed to have limited quan-
tum computing power, our first protocol needs to be improved. In our first fault-tolerant
protocol, the client may also leak some information which can be exploited by a side-
channel attack.
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To reduce the client’s large quantum computing overhead, we propose our second
fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol. The error-correcting qubits will be
prepared fault-tolerantly by the server. The client is required only to buffer eight logi-
cal qubits and send one chosen at random every time when generating an input logical
qubit. Our second fault-tolerant protocol avoids the additional quantum computing
requirement for the client and still preserves two advantages of our first protocol. It
provides more fault-tolerance and uses fewer qubits. Furthermore, the side-channel
attack which works against our first protocol does not work against our second pro-
tocol. The idea of letting the server prepare error-correcting qubits can be applied to
other protocol to make them more fault-tolerant.
This paper is the first work analysing the quantum computation overhead of the
client. In section 2, we will introduce related work. In section 3, we will describe the
first protocol of fault-tolerant blind quantum computation using fault-tolerant circuit.
In section 4, we will present the second protocol to reduce the client’s computation
effort. In section 5, we will analyse and compare the computation overhead between
different protocols. Section 6 will be the conclusion.
2. RELATED WORK
Protecting the client’s private data from the computing server during a computation is
a long-standing problem, but if achievable it is valuable for cloud computing. In 2009,
this problem was solved both in classical computing and quantum computing. Gentry
proposed a fully homomorphic encryption which makes it possible to perform mathe-
matical operations directly on encrypted data and get the result in an encrypted form
which can be decrypted only by someone holding the original encryption key [Childs
2005; Gentry 2009a; 2009b]. Broadbent et al. proposed a universal blind quantum com-
putation which allows the client to utilize the quantum computing power on the server
without revealing the computation, including input, output and even the algorithm.
The security of classical homomorphic encryption is based on difficult mathematical
problems, while the security of the blind quantum computation is based on the physical
properties of quantum systems, assuming the client has a good source of classical ran-
dom bits. Homomorphic encryption has enormous computing overhead and the server
learns what computation is being performed, even though it learns nothing about the
data. Blind quantum computation requires sophisticated quantum computers. Though
blind quantum computation is proved to be theoretically perfectly secure, the security
of a practical implementation is an open question.
Childs first proposed the idea of blind quantum computation and proved that the
client can conceal the quantum input and output from the server [Childs 2005]. But
the protocol requires the client to have a fault-tolerant quantum memory and to do
quantum operations. Arrighi and Salvail proposed another approach which lets the
server compute multiple quantum inputs, most of which are decoys [Arrighi and Sal-
vail 2006]. This approach can’t do universal computation and the real quantum inputs
are not encrypted. Broadbent et al. proposed the first universal blind quantum compu-
tation using the measurement-based quantum computation model [Raussendorf et al.
2003; Broadbent et al. 2009]. The client is only required to prepare a large set of qubits
one at a time, randomly chosen from a finite set, and to send the qubits to the server.
Dunjko et al. pointed out the difficulties of preparing and sending qubits over a long
distance [Dunjko et al. 2012]. They proposed a remote blind qubit state preparation
protocol that requires Alice to prepare only weak coherent pulses, but the blindness
will not be perfect. Morimae and Fujii show a fault-tolerant blind quantum compu-
tation using topologically protected measurement-based quantum computation [Mori-
mae and Fujii 2012]. Their approach uses a more fault-tolerant computation model on
the server, but the input qubits are still not protected during the transmission. Other
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different blind quantum computation schemes are also proposed recently [Chia et al.
2012; Sueki et al. 2013]. Compared to the previous protocol, our protocol applies quan-
tum error correction on the client so that the input qubits can be protected during the
transmission, while the client still has a low resource requirement. Our work covers
three areas in quantum computation, including measurement-based quantum compu-
tation, universal blind quantum computation, and quantum error correction. We will
introduce the basic concept of quantum computation first. Then we will describe each
area in the following subsections.
2.1. Basic Quantum Computation
A qubit is a basic unit of quantum information, which is stored on a two-state
quantum-mechanical system, e.g. the polarization of a single photon or the spin of
a single electron [Nielsen and Chuang 2010; Ladd et al. 2010]. A qubit is a superpo-
sition of two basis states, and it is generally represented using the ket notation as
|ψ〉 = α|0〉 + β|1〉, where α and β are probability amplitudes, and α, β ∈ C. |0〉 and
|1〉 are ket notations for the basis vectors
(
1
0
)
and
(
0
1
)
. When we measure this qubit
in the computational (standard) basis MZ = {|0〉, |1〉}, the outcome is |0〉 with prob-
ability |α|2 and |1〉 with probability |β|2. More precisely, (α, β) can be represented as
(cos(θ/2), eiφ sin(θ/2)), where 0 ≤ θ, φ < 2pi, and φ is called the phase.
Two or more qubits can be entangled, and they will be in a superposition of a single
quantum state, which means we can only know the state of the whole system but not
any one of the qubits individually. For example, a common pair of qubits called a Bell
pair or EPR pair is represented as |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉A ⊗ |0〉B + |1〉A ⊗ |1〉B), where the
subscript is the index of qubits. If we measure the first qubit of the entangled states
|Φ+〉 and the measurement result is |1〉, the second qubit will become |1〉. It seems that
the two qubits in the entangled state have a connection. Although the state of each
qubit is random, they are not independent. Their states are correlated in a fashion not
explainable by sheer classical probability.
In general, a quantum computation is described using the quantum circuit model
in which a computation is a sequence of quantum gates. Quantum gates are unitary
operators generally represented by matrices. We can use the vector form to represent
the qubit as |ψ〉 = α
(
1
0
)
+β
(
0
1
)
when we want to calculate the output of the quantum
gates. The following equation shows the matrix form of some quantum gates.
I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, H =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
, X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, Rz(θ) =
[
1 0
0 eiθ
]
,
CNOT =
 1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 , CZ =
 1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 −1
 , CPhase =
 1 0 0 00 1 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 i
 , (1)
I is the identity gate. H is the Hadamard gate. X is the Pauli-X or NOT gate. Z is the
Pauli-Z gate. Rz(θ) is the phase shift gate, where 0 ≤ θ < 2pi. Rz(pi) is the Pauli-Z gate,
Rz(
pi
2 ) is called the S or phase gate, and Rz(
pi
4 ) is called the T gate. Rz(
3pi
2 ) is the inverse
S gate, and Rz( 7pi4 ) is the inverse T gate. CNOT is the controlled-NOT gate. CZ is the
controlled-Z gate. CPhase is the controlled-phase gate. Fig. 1 shows the diagram of
some gates in the quantum circuit model. Each line, called a wire, represents a qubit.
The SWAP gate swaps two input qubits. For the CNOT, CZ, and CPhase gates, the
upper qubit is the control qubit and the lower qubit is the target qubit. If the control
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H X Z TS+
T+
X Z
S
S
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
(g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)
Fig. 1. Diagram of quantum gates. Each line (wire) represents a qubit. Input from the left and output from
the right. In two-qubit and three-qubit gates, the wire with black dot represents a control qubit and the
other represents a target qubit. (a) Hadamard gate (b) Pauli-X gate (c) Pauli-Z gate (d) S (phase) gate (e)
inverse S gate (f) T (pi/8) gate (g) inverse T gate (h) CNOT gate (i) CZ gate (j) CPhase gate (k) SWAP gate (l)
Toffoli gate
bit is 1, CNOT will apply an X gate on the target qubit, CZ will apply a Z gate on the
target qubit, and CPhase will apply an S gate on the target qubit. The Toffoli gate has
two control qubits and one target qubit. Only when both control bits are 1, the Toffoli
gate will apply an X gate on the target.
A qubit has an infinite number of possible states. When we measure a qubit with an
operator M , which is a 2×2 Hermitian (self-adjoint) matrix, the qubit will be projected
to one of its two eigenstates (eigenvectors) corresponding to the eigenvalue, which is
the measurement result. The eigenstates of the operator form an orthonormal basis,
thus, we can also use this basis to distinguish the measurement. In quantum compu-
tation, we generally measure a qubit in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉}, which is the
same as measuring with operator Z. Any qubit can be represented as a superposition
of the eigenstates of the measurement operator. For example,
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉 = α+ β√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) + α− β√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). (2)
When we measure a qubit |ψ〉 in the basis {|0〉 ± |1〉}, which is measuring with oper-
ator X, the qubit will be 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) with probability (α+β)22 and 1√2 (|0〉 + |1〉) with
probability (α−β)
2
2 .
2.2. Measurement-based Quantum Computation
Measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC) or one-way quantum computation
is a quantum computation model proposed by Raussendorf and Briegel [Raussendorf
and Briegel 2001; Raussendorf et al. 2003]. MBQC uses an entangled state of many
qubits, called a cluster state, as the resource for universal quantum computation. The
computation is a sequence of one-qubit measurements on the qubits of this cluster
state. Every measurement will destroy the entanglement connection between the mea-
sured qubits and the others, and the remaining qubits become a smaller cluster state
modified by an operation. The computation is driven by measurements in designated
bases. Depending on the measurement basis and the measurement result, we learn
something about the state of the remaining entangled qubits. Managed carefully, ulti-
mately the resulting state represents the desired result, a function of our input qubits
[Danos and Kashefi 2006].
To prepare a cluster state, we initially prepare all the qubits in |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 +
|1〉) state. Then we apply CZ to each nearest neighbour pair. A cluster state can have
different structure, e.g. linear, 2-D, or 3-D. To do a computation on the cluster state, we
imprint its quantum circuit layout on the substrate cluster state by the measurements.
The redundant qubits are removed from the cluster state by being measured in the
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1
2
(a)
1
2
(b)
Fig. 2. Diagram of two measurement-based quantum computation using different entangled qubits. Circles
represent qubits, and lines represent entangling operators. After the generic entangling operations, each
qubit is measured in a carefully chosen basis. The value written in each circle is the angle of the measure-
ment basis used for measuring the qubit. (a) Measurement-based quantum computation of a controlled-NOT
gate on a 2-D cluster state. The removed qubits in the lower part is measured by the computational basis.
(b) Measurement-based quantum computation of a controlled-NOT gate on a brick state.
computational basis. Each remaining qubit is measured in a particular kind of basis
M(θ) = {|0〉 ± eiθ|1〉}, where 0 ≤ θ < 2pi, based on the quantum circuit. θ is called
the angle of the measurement basis. The upper part of Fig. 2(a) shows a cluster state,
which is a 2-dimensional array of cluster state. The lower part of Fig. 2(a) shows the
angle θ of the measurement basis Mθ of executing a CNOT gate on two qubits using
the 2-D cluster. A horizontal line of qubits is analogous to a wire in the quantum circuit
diagram, see Fig. 1. The two qubits in the left squares are the inputs, and two qubits
in the right squares are the outputs; the upper qubits are the control qubits and the
lower qubits are the target qubits. The output qubits have to be corrected by some
Pauli gates based on the previous measurement results. The cluster state is generic
and can be prepared before the computation, but the redundant qubits can only be
removed after the target computation is chosen.
2.3. Universal Blind Quantum Computation
Universal blind quantum computation (UBQC) is a special application of
measurement-based quantum computation. A client called Alice wants to execute a
quantum computation on a server called Bob because she doesn’t have enough quan-
tum computing power. If Alice wants to conceal her computation from everyone else,
including Bob, she can use universal blind quantum computation. Most of the blind
quantum computation protocols are similar to the protocol of Broadbent, Fitzsimons,
and Kashefi, which we call BFK. In order to conceal the computation, blind quan-
tum computation does not use the typical cluster state because removing the redun-
dant qubits reveals information about the choice of quantum gates, which is shown
in Fig. 2(a). In standard MBQC, the computing qubits are measured in the M(θ) ba-
sis, while the redundant qubits are measured in the computational basis. BFK in-
stead uses a specially designed entangled state called the brickwork state as shown
in Fig. 3(b), where all qubits are measured in the M(θ) basis. The comparison of en-
tangled states used in MBQC and UBQC is shown in Fig. 2, where the upper part
shows the entangled states required to implement a CNOT gate, and the lower part
shows the measurement basis to perform a CNOT gate. A brickwork state is a uniform
structure, which only reveals the upper bound of the size of the computation. It is a
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(b)
U1
U3
U2
(a)
1
2
3
4
U1
U2
U3
U4
U5
Layer 1 Layer 2 Layer 3
1
2
3
4
U4
U5
Fig. 3. (a) The circuit model of a quantum computation of four qubits. Each block represents a quantum
gate. (b) The brickwork state for the quantum computation. The Five bricks are even-odd interleavingly
tiled to a brickwork state with three layers. Each brick can be used to implement a quantum gate. In each
brick, the squares on the left indicate inputs, and the squares on the right indicate outputs.
tiling of 10-qubit entangled states, which we call bricks. Each brick can implement a
quantum gate, including Hadamard gate, Pauli-X gate, Pauli-Z gate, S gate, T gate,
and CNOT gate. This set is sufficient for universal quantum computation [Nielsen and
Chuang 2010]. We should note that bricks are interleaved, so quantum gates can only
act on specific two adjacent lines of qubits in each layer of the brickwork state. Thus,
swap gates are required for implementing quantum gates which are operated on two
non-adjacent qubits in the blind quantum computation.
In measurement-based quantum computation, the output qubits have to be corrected
by some Pauli gates based on the previous measurement results. The correction can be
performed on the next measurement by the modification of measurement basis. For a
brickwork state of the size n×m, let each qubit |ψx,y〉 be indexed by a column x ∈ 1, ...n
and a row y ∈ 1, ...,m. Every measurement depends on the previous measurement
results, and these results can be assigned to two dependency sets Xx,y and Zx,y by the
flow construction [Danos and Kashefi 2006]. The measurement basis with correction is
φ′x,y = (−1)s
X
x,yφx,y+s
Z
x,ypi, where φx,y is the original measurement basis for a quantum
gate when the qubit is prepared as |+〉. If the qubits in the brickwork state are all
prepared in the |+〉 state, then the measurement bases will reveal information about
the quantum gate. Thus, each qubit is prepared in a randomly-chosen state from the
set { 1√
2
(|0〉+ eiθx,y |1〉)|θx,y = 0, pi/4, ..., 7pi/4}, where θx,y is called the angle of the qubit.
In measurement-base quantum computation, measuring a qubit |0〉 + eiθ|1〉 in M(θ)
has the same effect as measuring a qubit |0〉+ |1〉 in M(0). Therefore, the measurement
basis of each qubit in the brickwork state becomes M(φ′x,y + θx,y). We can see that the
measurement basis will be random if θx,y is random. A random number is also added to
the angle of the measurement basis to conceal the quantum information of the qubit,
which will also flip the measurement results. The basic steps of BFK’s protocol are as
follows.
(1) The preparation stage
(a) Alice prepares each qubit |ψx,y〉 randomly chosen from the set { 1√2 (|0〉 +
eiθx,y |1〉)|θx,y = 0, pi/4, ..., 7pi/4}, and sends them to Bob via the quantum chan-
nel.
(b) Bob creates the entangled brickwork state shown in Fig. 3 (b).
(2) The interactive measurement stage
For each column x = 1,...,m in the brickwork state
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For each row y = 1,...,n in the brickwork state
(a) Alice computes φ′x,y based on the real measurement angle φx,y and the previous
measurement results in order to achieve execution of the matching step of the
MBQC (e.g. the gate in the application algorithm)
(b) Alice chooses a random bit rx,y ∈ {0, 1} and sends the angle δx,y = φ′x,y + θx,y +
pirx,y, where r is a random bit, to Bob via the classical channel.
(c) Bob measures |ψx,y〉 in the basis {|0〉 ± eiδx,y |1〉} and sends the one-bit result to
Alice via the classical channel.
(d) If rx,y = 1 above, Alice flips the result bit; otherwise she does nothing
2.4. Steane Code and Fault-tolerant Quantum Computation
There are many different kinds of quantum error correction codes [Gottesman 2009;
Devitt et al. 2011; Terhal 2013]. In this paper, we will use a quantum error correction
code called Steane’s [[7,1,3]] code, which uses seven entangled physical qubits to en-
code one logical qubit and has the ability to correct one physical qubit error [Steane
1996]. The [[7,1,3]] code is a stabilizer code, which is generally described by the stabi-
lizer formalism [Gottesman 1997]. A state |ψ〉 is stabilized by K if K|ψ〉 = |ψ〉. Every
state in the [[7,1,3]] code is stabilized by these six operators,
K1 = IIIXXX,K2 = XIXIXIX,K3 = IXXIIXX,
K4 = IIIZZZ,K5 = ZIZIZIZ,K6 = IZZIIZZ.
(3)
Applying any of those operators to the state has no effect on the encoded logical state.
Measuring whether the state is in the +1 or -1 eigenstate of each of these operators,
as described below, gives us error syndrome information. These operators are useful
in the synthesis of quantum circuits for preparing encoded states and error correc-
tion. To do a fault-tolerant quantum computation, we need to perform fault-tolerant
quantum gates and fault-tolerant measurements on the error-correcting code blocks.
A fault-tolerant quantum gate or a fault-tolerant measurement is implemented by a
quantum circuit. Any single error in the circuit should not generate two error qubits
in the same error-correcting code block. Thus, every error correction code block can
correct its single qubit error after the fault-tolerant quantum gates or fault-tolerant
measurements [Nielsen and Chuang 2010; Devitt et al. 2011].
Any logical qubit |ψ〉 encoded by the [[7,1,3]] code will be represented by |ψ〉L. Any
fault-tolerant gate U for the [[7,1,3]] code will be represented by UL. There are two
kinds of fault-tolerant gates for the [[7,1,3]] code. For Clifford group gates, includ-
ing Identity gates, Hadamard gates, Pauli gates, S gates, and CNOT gates, fault-
tolerant gates are implemented by applying gates transversally on each qubit in the
code as shown in the left of Fig. 4. For non-Clifford group gates, including T gates,
fault-tolerant gates are implemented with the help of additional qubits, called ancilla
qubits. The implementation of a fault-tolerant T gate for the [[7,1,3]] code is shown
in Fig. 4 (g). The red dashed box is the preparation of a special ancilla logical qubit
(|0〉 + eipi/4|1〉)L. If the result of fault-tolerant measuring the ancilla logical qubit |0〉L
with operator (e−ipi/4SX)L is 1, a fault-tolerant ZL is applied to correct the output
state. After applying CNOTL on this ancilla logical qubit and the input logical qubit,
we fault-tolerantly measure the input logical qubit with operator ZL and then apply
fault-tolerant SX on the ancilla logical qubit if the measurement result is 1. After that,
the ancilla logical qubit is the output of this gate.
To measure an error correction code state fault-tolerantly, we do not measure them
directly. Instead, we use ancilla qubits to extract information from the code state and
then measure the ancilla qubits. The measurement result is a majority vote from
three repetitions of this measurement procedure. Fig. 5 shows a procedure for fault-
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Fig. 4. Quantum circuit of fault-tolerant gates for the [[7,1,3]] code. (a) fault-tolerant Hadamard gate (b)
fault-tolerant Pauli-X gate (c) fault-tolerant Pauli-Z gate (d) fault-tolerant S gate (e) fault-tolerant inverse
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Fig. 5. Fault-tolerantly measuring the operator ZL on the [[7,1,3]] code
tolerantly measuring operator ZL on the [[7,1,3]] code. The red dashed box shows seven
ancilla qubits are prepared as the state 1√
2
(|0000000〉 + |1111111〉) and they are veri-
fied by measuring another ancilla qubit. Fault-tolerant measurements are also used
to prepare each encoded state. The |0〉L state is prepared by fault-tolerantly measur-
ing seven |0〉 qubits with operator K1,K2, and K3. Depending on the measurement
results, a Z gate may be applied to one of the qubits in the code block to make the
correct |0〉L state. Fig. 6 shows the fault-tolerant preparation of a |0〉L state encoded
with the [[7,1,3]] code. By applying additional fault-tolerant quantum gates, any other
code state can be prepared. The special state (|0〉+ eipi/4|1〉)L used in the fault-tolerant
T gate is prepared by fault-tolerantly measuring operator e−ipi/4SX on state |0〉L as
shown in Fig. 7. Quantum error correction is achieved by extracting the error syn-
drome from the code state and then applying corrections to the code state. The error
syndrome extraction for the [[7,1,3]] code is also performed by fault-tolerantly measur-
ing the code state with the operators K1,K2,K3,K4,K5, and K6. Depending on the
measurement results, a Z gate and a X gate may be applied to one of the qubits in
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Fig. 6. (a) Fault-tolerantly measuring the operator K1 on the [[7,1,3]] code. (b) Fault-tolerant preparation
of a |0〉L state encoded with the [[7,1,3]] code.
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Fig. 8. (a) Sample quantum circuit (b) The fault-tolerant quantum circuit of the sample quantum circuit.
the code to correct the error. Fig. 8 shows an example of how to build a fault-tolerant
quantum circuit with quantum error correction [Nielsen and Chuang 2010].
2.5. BFK Fault-tolerant Blind Quantum Computation
Broadbent et al. showed that their blind quantum computation can be made fault-
tolerant [Broadbent et al. 2009]. Alice first converts the target computation to a fault-
tolerant circuit. The first phase of the circuit is building the quantum state for the
input variables, encoding the input data into a quantum error correction code. Within
the code block, all qubit wires are permuted. For the non-Clifford group fault-tolerant
gates and fault-tolerant measurement, ancilla qubits are required and they should be
measured in the computational basis. Ancilla qubit wires are added and evenly spaced
through the circuit and they are re-used. All the ancilla qubits have to be measured
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at the same time, at a regular interval, after each fault-tolerant gate. Since some of
the ancilla are not used at the time of measurement, their measurement results are
meaningless. Then Alice converts the fault-tolerant circuit to a measurement-based
computation on the brickwork state. Ancilla qubits are still measured in the computa-
tional basis, which is different from other measurements. Lastly, Alice does this fault-
tolerant computation using the basic blind quantum computation. In addition, she has
to periodically instruct Bob to measure all ancilla qubits in the computational basis.
In the FT form of BFK, only Bob does quantum error correction but not Alice. Error
correction is run on top of the brickwork state, requiring Alice to directly process all
of the phases of error correction, including syndrome extraction and correction opera-
tions. This approach has two drawbacks: first, the amount of classical communication
required between Alice and Bob is enormous, and classical communication latencies
may become important; second, because the individual underlying qubits are not error-
protected, the error rate induced by the initial teleportation stage may become more of
an issue.
3. BLIND QUANTUM COMPUTATION USING FAULT-TOLERANT CIRCUITS
To improve the fault-tolerance of blind quantum computation, we propose the first
fault-tolerant quantum computation protocol which applies quantum error correction
underneath blind quantum computation. All of the qubits in the blind quantum com-
putation are encoded by one layer of the [[7,1,3]] code and all quantum operations
are replaced by fault-tolerant operations. Thus, Alice’s computational capability must
grow to have the ability to fault-tolerantly prepare error correction code blocks. Bob
will use a fault-tolerant circuit to implement measurement-based quantum computa-
tion in blind quantum computation.
In our first fault-tolerant protocol, Alice has to prepare input logical qubits encoded
in one layer of the [[7,1,3]] code. All logical qubits are prepared by applying fault-
tolerant phase shift gates to the 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)L code state. 1√2 (|0〉+ |1〉)L is prepared by
applying a fault-tolerant Hadamard gate to initial |0〉L code state. To prepare 1√2 (|0〉+
eiθ|1〉)L, where θ = 0, pi/4, 2pi/4, 3pi/4, 4pi/4, 5pi/4, 6pi/4, 7pi/4, Alice applies IL, TL, SL,
(TS)L, ZL, (TZ)L, (S†)L, (TS†)L respectively to the 1√2 (|0〉 + |1〉)L code state. Thus,
Alice is required to do a small fault-tolerant quantum computation to prepare each
encoded logical qubit.
Bob also has to change his operations in our first fault-tolerant blind quantum com-
putation protocol. His operation is similar to the BFK basic blind quantum computa-
tion protocol, except all quantum operations are fault-tolerant. In the basic protocol,
Bob has to do two things: first, he entangles the received qubits to create a brickwork
state; second, he sequentially measures each qubit in the M(δx,y) basis, where x, y
represents the qubit in the x column and y row of the brickwork state, using the ba-
sis requested by Alice, and tells Alice the measurement results. The brickwork state
can be divided into layers and then be divided into bricks as shown in Fig. 3 (b). The
output qubits of each layer are the input qubits of the following layer. After the blind
quantum computation is finished in the first layer, the second layer starts, and so on.
Within each layer, every brick is independent. Thus, if Bob can do the fault-tolerant
blind quantum computation on a brick, he can do the fault-tolerant blind quantum
computation on the brickwork state.
Bob’s quantum operations on a brick in the blind quantum computation are imple-
mented by an equivalent quantum circuit as shown in Fig. 9 (b). Ten qubits are entan-
gled by CZ gates, then eight qubits are measured in the M(δx,y) basis. For measure-
ment basis M(δx,y), where δx,y = 0, pi/4, 2pi/4, 3pi/4, 4pi/4, 5pi/4, 6pi/4, 7pi/4, Bob applies
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Fig. 9. The equivalent quantum circuit for the server’s quantum operation on a brick in blind quantum
computation, including entanglements, phase shift gates, Hadamard gates, and measurements. R repre-
sents a phase shift operation, which can be implemented by a composition of Z gate, S gate, and T gate. M
represents measurement in the computational basis.
H, HTS†, HS†, HTZ, HZ, HTS, HS, or HT , respectively, before a measurement in the
computational basis. The phase shift gates, Hadamard gates, and measurement should
be performed in the order of alphabet indexed in the figure. Then this quantum circuit
is transformed to a fault-tolerant quantum circuit which uses one layer of the [[7,1,3]]
code. Each qubit is replaced by a seven-qubit code block and all gates are changed
to fault-tolerant quantum gates. For the fault-tolerant T gates and the fault-tolerant
measurement in the computational basis, ancilla qubits are added to the circuit. Since
the quantum circuit of blind quantum computation on a brick is fault-tolerant, the
blind quantum computation on a brickwork state by repeating this quantum circuit is
fault-tolerant.
Our first fault-tolerant protocol is shown in Protocol 1. Alice prepares each qubit
in the brickwork state by fault-tolerantly preparing encoded |0〉L state and fault-
tolerantly applying a random phase shift on the code state. Then she sends it to Bob.
Bob fault-tolerantly entangles all the encoded logical qubits to create a brickwork state
using fault-tolerant CZ gates as shown in Fig. 9 (b). Then Bob performs a fault-tolerant
phase shift (−δx,y)L, which is assigned by Alice, on each encoded logical qubit |ψx,y〉L
before measuring it in the computational basis. The phase shifts assigned by Alice
are still calculated as in the BFK basic protocol. The phase shifts and measurements
still follow the order of the column of the qubits. Since every qubit in this protocol is
encoded with the error correction code and all quantum operations are performed by
fault-tolerant quantum circuit, this protocol is fault-tolerant. Except for the underlying
quantum error correction code and the fault-tolerant quantum circuit, this protocol fol-
lows the BFK basic blind quantum computation. The fault-tolerant circuit to prepare
encoded logical qubits, to entangle encoded logical qubits, and to measure encoded log-
ical qubits are all independent of the inputs, outputs and the quantum gates in the
target computation. Thus, the blindness of this protocol is the same as the BFK basic
blind quantum computation. This protocol reveals only the information of the upper
bound of the size of the computation.
From Fig. 10, we can clearly see the difference between the BFK fault-tolerant proto-
col and our first fault-tolerant protocol using fault-tolerant circuits. The top part of the
figure shows what Alice should prepare before starting the blind quantum computa-
tion protocol. The bottom part of the figure shows how the blind quantum computation
proceeds. In the BFK fault-tolerant protocol, Alice has to convert her target computa-
tion to a fault-tolerant quantum circuit with additional evenly-separated ancilla qubits
measured in the computational basis at the same time with a regular interval. Then
she converts the fault-tolerant quantum circuit to measurement patterns for the blind
quantum computation. After that, she can perform the blind quantum computation
using the basic protocol, with additional periodic measurements in the computational
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PROTOCOL 1: Fault-tolerant Blind Quantum Computation Using Fault-tolerant Circuit
(1) The preparation stage
(a) For each encoded logical qubit |ψx,y〉L in the brickwork state, Alice fault-tolerantly
prepares a 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)L logical qubit encoded in one layer of the Steane [[7,1,3]] code
and applies a fault-tolerant phase shift θx,y, where θx,y is randomly chosen from
{0, pi/4, 2pi/4, 3pi/4, 4pi/4, 5pi/4, 6pi/4, 7pi/4}. Then the encoded logical qubits are sent to
Bob via the quantum channel.
(b) Bob fault-tolerantly entangles all the encoded logical qubits to create the brickwork
state using fault-tolerant fault-tolerant CZ gates.
(2) The interactive measurement stage
For each column x = 1,...,m in the brickwork state
For each row y = 1,...,n in the brickwork state
(a) Alice computes φ′x,y based on the real measurement angle φx,y and the previous
measurement results.
(b) Alice chooses a random bit rx,y ∈ {0, 1} and sends δx,y = φ′x,y + θx,y + pirx,y to Bob via
the classical channel.
(c) Bob applies a fault-tolerant phase shift (−δx,y)L and a fault-tolerant Hadamard gate on
the encoded logical qubit |ψx,y〉L and fault-tolerantly measures the encoded logical
qubit in the computational basis. The one-bit measurement result is sent to Alice via
the classical channel.
(d) If rx,y = 1 above, Alice flips the result bit; otherwise she does nothing.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of fault-tolerant blind quantum computation. The upper part shows Alice’s preparation
before the fault-tolerant blind quantum computation. The lower part shows the steps of protocol. The dashed
line separates the quantum part and the classical part of the blind quantum computation. (a) The BFK fault-
tolerant protocol (b) Our first fault-tolerant protocol (c) Our second fault-tolerant protcol, the BSA protocol.
basis. In our first fault-tolerant protocol using fault-tolerant circuits, Alice converts
her target circuit to measurement patterns for the blind quantum computation be-
fore she starts the fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol. Alice has to do
fault-tolerant quantum computation to prepare the encoded input qubits. Bob fault-
tolerantly entangles all the qubits and fault-tolerantly measures them.
Compared to the BFK fault-tolerant protocol, our first fault-tolerant blind quantum
computation has two advantages. First, our first fault-tolerant protocol provides more
fault-tolerance. Teleporting QEC-encoded states protects against errors in our qubits
that occur during the teleportation process. At the physical level, quantum repeater
networks may reach reasonably high fidelities, but the error rates necessary to exe-
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cute e.g. 1015 logical gates successfully are out of the question. Our approach will be
useful if Alice and Bob are not directly connected. Second, Alice prepares fewer physi-
cal qubits and the amount of classical communication required between Alice and Bob
is far less. In our first fault-tolerant protocol, Alice prepares a constant factor (seven
times for Steane’s [[7,1,3]] code) more qubits than she needs in the BFK basic protocol.
In the BFK fault-tolerant protocol, performing the fault-tolerant quantum computa-
tion on top of the brickwork state makes the brickwork state a linear growth because
the number of additional swap gates is linear in the size of the computation. These
additional swap gates are used to avoid CNOT gates operating on non-adjacent qubits.
Thus, Alice has to prepare a linear factor more qubits than she needs in the BFK ba-
sic protocol. Since Alice and Bob need to exchange classical messages between each
measurement, preparing and measuring more qubits requires stricter conditions on
classical communication latencies.
Our first fault-tolerant protocol has two disadvantages. First, Alice is required to do
fault-tolerant quantum computation to prepare encoded input qubits, and her quan-
tum computational overhead is proportional to the qubits she prepared, which is the
total size of the brickwork state. This is a tough requirement for Alice, who has limited
quantum computing power. Second, Alice may leak some information which can be ex-
ploited by a side-channel attack. Since the fault-tolerant T gates consumes much more
quantum resources than other fault-tolerant gates, preparing encoded logical qubits
1√
2
(|0〉 + eiθ|1〉)L, where θ = pi/4, 3pi/4, 5pi/4, 7pi/4, consumes more power from Alice.
If Bob or a third-party attacker can probe the computing power or the preparation
time during Alice’s preparation of encoded logical qubits, they can learn if the encoded
logical qubits are prepared by fault-tolerant T gates. Thus, this protocol will not be per-
fectly secure. To overcome these two drawbacks of our first fault-tolerant protocol, we
propose our second fault-tolerant protocol which requires Alice only to receive, buffer
and send qubits.
4. BUFFER SHUFFLE ALICE PROTOCOL
To lower Alice’s requirement of quantum computing power and reduce Alice’s compu-
tation overhead, we propose the second protocol, which lets Bob prepare the encoded
logical qubits. This protocol is called the Buffer Shuffle Alice (BSA) Protocol. Since
Alice cannot reveal any input information to Bob, Alice must retain the decision of
selecting input logical qubits. The second fault-tolerant blind quantum computation
protocol also has two stages. The first stage is the preparation stage. A brickwork state
will be created for the blind quantum computation. For each encoded logical qubit in
the brickwork state, Bob fault-tolerantly prepares a fixed set of eight different logical
qubits encoded in the [[7,1,3]] code and sends them in a fixed order to Alice via the
quantum channel. Alice has to buffer these encoded logical qubits before she sends
back to Bob an encoded input qubit which is one encoded logical qubit randomly cho-
sen from these encoded logical qubits. Then Bob entangles all received encoded logical
qubits to create a brickwork state by performing a fault-tolerant quantum circuit as
shown in Fig. 9 (b). The second stage is the interactive measurement stage, which is
the same as our first protocol. Alice calculates the δ of the measurement basis M(δ)
and sends the value to Bob via the classical channel. Bob fault-tolerantly measures
each encoded logical qubits in the M(δ) basis and sends back the measurement result
to Alice for her later calculation. This protocol is shown in Protocol 2.
Since every qubit in the BSA protocol is encoded with quantum error correction code
and all quantum operations are performed by fault-tolerant quantum circuits, this
protocol is fault-tolerant. The underlying error correction code and the fault-tolerant
quantum circuit in the BSA protocol is independent of the input, output, and quantum
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PROTOCOL 2: Buffer Shuffle Alice Protocol
(1) The preparation stage
(a) For each encoded logical qubit |ψx,y〉L in the brickwork state, Bob fault-tolerantly
prepares a set of eight 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)L logical qubits encoded in one-layer of the Steane’s
[[7,1,3]] code and applies fault-tolerant phase shift gates θx,y, where
θx,y = 0, pi/4, 2pi/4, 3pi/4, 4pi/4, 5pi/4, 6pi/4, 7pi/4 to these qubits respectively. Then the set
of encoded logical qubits is sent to Alice in a fixed order via the quantum channel.
(b) Alice buffers the received logical qubits before she receives a set of encoded logical
qubits. She sends back one encoded logical qubits randomly chosen from the set as an
input logical qubit and discards the rest.
(c) Bob fault-tolerantly entangles all the encoded logical qubits to create the brickwork
state using fault-tolerant CZ gates.
(2) The interactive measurement stage
For each column x = 1,...,m in the brickwork state
For each row y = 1,...,n in the brickwork state
(a) Alice computes φ′x,y based on the real measurement angle φx,y and the previous
measurement results.
(b) Alice chooses a random bit rx,y ∈ {0, 1} and sends δx,y = φ′x,y + θx,y + pirx,y to Bob via
the classical channel.
(c) Bob applies a fault-tolerant phase shift (−δx,y)L and a Hadamard gate on the encoded
logical qubit |ψx,y〉L and fault-tolerantly measures the encoded logical qubit in the
computational basis. The one-bit measurement result is sent to Alice via the classical
channel.
(d) If rx,y = 1 above, Alice flips the result bit; otherwise she does nothing.
gates in the target computation. The BSA protocol follows the BFK basic blind quan-
tum computation protocol except the preparation of the input qubits for the brickwork
state. Bob prepares a fixed set of eight qubits with different phases and sends them in
a fixed order, which is known by Alice and Bob. Alice randomly chooses one encoded
logical qubit as an input logical qubit. The phase of the encoded logical qubit is a ran-
dom number and is only known by Alice. Since Alice prepares no qubits and only tells
Bob the classical information of the measurement basis for each qubit in the brickwork
state. We only need to prove that this classical information reveals no information of
the quantum computation. Let θ be the set of chosen phases of every encoded input
qubit. Let φ′ be the set of modified angles of measurement basis for the implementa-
tion of the quantum gate depending on the previous measurement results. Let r be a
random bit string generated by Alice. The angle of the measurement basis which Alice
tells Bob is calculated as follows.
δx,y = φ
′
x,y + θx,y + pirx,y, (4)
where x, y represents the qubit is in the x column and y row of the brickwork state.
Since θ is a random number, δ is independent of φ′. The angles of measurement basis
which Alice tells Bob reveal no information of the quantum gates in the blind quantum
computation. Since r is a random bit, δ is also independent of θ. The angles of measure-
ment basis which Alice tells Bob reveals no information of the input and output qubits
in the blind quantum computation, too. Thus, we have shown that Alice reveals no
information of the target quantum computation in this protocol, except the number of
input qubits, which is an upper bound of the size of the computation.
Compared to our first fault-tolerant protocol, the BSA protocol avoids the additional
quantum computing requirement for Alice and still preserves the same fault-tolerance
ability. Since Alice doesn’t have to do fault-tolerant quantum computation to prepare
different encoded logical qubits, the side-channel attack described in the last section
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will not work on the BSA protocol. The BSA protocol has two differences from the BFK
fault-tolerant protocol, see Fig. 10. First, quantum error correction and fault-tolerant
quantum circuit is applied underneath the blind quantum computation in the BSA pro-
tocol, while quantum error correction and fault-tolerant quantum circuit is applied on
top of the blind quantum computation in the BFK fault-tolerant protocol. Second, Alice
buffers and selects encoded logical qubits prepared by Bob in the BSA protocol, while
Alice prepares qubits with random phase shifts in the BFK fault-tolerant protocol.
Compared to the BFK fault-tolerant protocol, the BSA protocol has the following
advantages. First, the demands made of Alice’s system are very low. She only buffers,
receives, and sends encoded logical qubits. Second, the BSA protocol provides more
fault-tolerance. Alice and Bob can be connected by a long and noisy channel if quan-
tum error correction can be performed on the states end-to-end. Third, the amount
of quantum and classical communication required between Alice and Bob is less. For
each logical qubit in the brickwork state, Bob sends eight logical qubits, which are 56
physical qubits, to Alice. Alice returns one logical qubit to Bob. The total number of
physical qubits transmitted in the quantum channel is 63 times the number of logical
qubits in the brickwork state. In BFK fault-tolerant protocol, the size of the brickwork
state will be increased by a linear factor compared to the computational size because
additional swap gates are used to avoid CNOT gates operating on non-adjacent qubits.
There are two trade-off in the BSA protocol. First, Alice has to buffer eight logical
qubits at a time, a total of 56 physical qubits if the Steane’s [[7,1,3]] code is used.
But she only needs to buffer eight receiving logical qubits before she selects and sends
one of them. The buffering time depends on the quantum transmission rate and the
quantum error correction code. Second, the BSA protocol consumes nine times as much
network bandwidth (that is, nine times as many end-to-end Bell pairs are requested
from the repeater network) as simply having Alice prepare and teleport the logical
qubits in our first fault-tolerant protocol. The total memory buffering requirement for
Alice can actually be reduced to two logical qubits, if Alice chooses to measure and
discard all but one of the eight qubits as they arrive. More complex buffering and
shuffling schemes could be used to reduce the 9x bandwidth penalty. We defer detailed
analysis of this to future work.
From the BFK fault-tolerant protocol and our two fault-tolerant protocols, we can see
that fault-tolerant blind quantum computation costs much more quantum resources
than the basic BFK blind quantum computation protocol. In the BFK fault-tolerant
protocol, the more complex fault-tolerant quantum circuit requires a larger size of
the brickwork state. Alice also has to prepare more qubits. In our two fault-tolerant
protocols, transmitting encoded logical qubits via quantum channel consumes more
quantum network bandwidth. In our first fault-tolerant protocol, Alice even has to do
quantum computation to prepare encoded logical qubits. We will examine the resource
consumption in our two fault-tolerant protocols in the next section.
5. RESOURCE ANALYSIS
To show the difference in resource consumption of our protocols, we analyse the blind
quantum computation of a 10-bit quantum carry-lookahead (QCLA) adder [Draper
et al. 2006]. A quantum adder is a useful component for constructing multipliers and
more elaborate circuits. It is also a basic subroutine in Shor’s algorithm [Shor 1997;
Vedral et al. 1996; Beckman et al. 1996]. The QCLA adder has a logarithmic depth
in the number of input qubits. A quantum circuit for a 10-bit in-place QCLA adder is
illustrated in Fig. 11.
To do a blind quantum computation, we need to convert the target quantum circuit
to measurement-based computation on a brickwork state. First, the quantum circuit is
converted to an equivalent circuit using single-qubit gates and CNOT gates. Second,
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Fig. 11. An 10-bit in-place quantum carry-lookahead adder. s is the sum of a and b. The subscript indexes
the bit in the number. [Draper et al. 2006]
we add swap gates in the circuit to make sure all CNOT gates operate on adjacent
qubits. Third, we arrange each quantum gate to fit in a brick of the brickwork state.
Each line in the circuit corresponds to a row of qubits in the brickwork state. Since
the bricks are even-odd interleaved in the brickwork state, CNOT gates can only be
arranged in specific layers. Fourth, in each brick, we assign each qubit a measurement
basis according to the quantum gate implemented by the brick.
We will take a Toffoli gate as an example to show how to convert the quantum circuit
to measurement-based quantum computation. First, a Toffoli gate is decomposed to
one-qubit gates and two-qubit gates as shown in Fig. 12 (a) [Shende and Markov 2009].
Second, two swap gates are added to make CNOT gates operate on adjacent qubits as
shown in Fig. 12 (b). Swap gates are also decomposed to three consecutive CNOT gates,
as there is no simpler construction of swap on the brickwork state. Third, all quantum
gates are arranged into a brick in the brickwork state as shown in Fig. 12 (c). Some
one-qubit gates and the following CNOT gates can be implemented in the same brick.
Fig. 12 (d) shows the brickwork state required to do the decomposed circuit of a Toffoli
gate in blind quantum computation. There are 14 layers of bricks. Three input qubits
in the circuit makes three rows of qubits in the brickwork state. Thus, this brickwork
state consists of 171 qubits. A brick consists of 10 qubits, but some qubits in the first
row and in the last row cannot form a brick. The entangled five-qubit groups, called
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Fig. 12. (a) Decomposition of a Toffoli gate. (b) Decomposed circuit where CNOT gates only operate on
adjacent qubits. Dashed boxes represent SWAP gates, which are decomposed to three consecutive CNOT
gates. (c) Arrange quantum gates to fit in the bricks in the brickwork state. (d) The brickwork state required
to implement a Toffoli gate.
half-bricks, can also implement one-qubit gates. The last step is to assign each qubit
a measurement basis according to the quantum gate implemented by the brick. For
those half-bricks or bricks which implement no quantum gates in the circuit, they
just implement one or two single-qubit identity gates. Thus every qubit is assigned a
measurement basis, except the last column of qubits which are the output qubits.
Before calculating the resource consumption of a 10-bit QCLA adder in our protocol,
we first calculate the resource consumption of the fault-tolerant quantum circuit for a
10-bit QCLA adder. The original circuit of a 10-bit QCLA adder has 35 input qubits,
and it consists of 63 Toffoli gates, 35 CNOT gates, and 18 NOT gates. Each Toffoli
gate can be decomposed into 7 T/T † gates, 6 CNOT gates, and 2 H gates. With the
decomposition of the Toffoli gates, the decomposed circuit consists of 441 T/T † gates,
413 CNOT gates, and 144 one-qubit Clifford group gates, and the number of its input
qubits remains the same. To implement a fault-tolerant T gate, we need to prepare
a |0〉L state before preparing 1√2 (|0〉 + eipi/4|1〉)L state. From Fig. 6, the fault-tolerant
circuit to prepare |0〉L state consists of 108 CNOT gates, 18 Hadamard gates, and a Z
gate. Form Fig. 4 (g), a fault-tolerant T gate consists of 21 T gate, 262 two-qubit Clifford
group gates, 50 one-qubit Clifford group gates, and 35 measurements. Other fault-
tolerant Clifford-group gates are implemented by applying non-fault-tolerant gates
transversally on each physical qubit. If we apply one layer of Steane’s [[7,1,3]] code
and fault-tolerant gates to this circuit, the fault-tolerant decomposed circuit consists
of 9,261 T/T †, 118,433 two-qubit Clifford group gates, 23,058 one-qubit Clifford group
gates, and 15,435 measurements. This fault-tolerant circuit requires 245 qubits and at
least 15 ancilla qubits for fault-tolerant T gates.
In our first fault-tolerant protocol, Alice has to prepare the encoded logical qubits.
We will calculate the resource consumption of this process. All qubits are prepared
from an initial |0〉L state. To prepare 1√2 (|0〉+eiθ|1〉)L, where θ = 0, 2pi/4, 4pi/4, 6pi/4, Al-
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ice applies fault-tolerant HL, (SH)L, (ZH)L, and (S†H)L to the |0〉L state. To prepare
1√
2
(|0〉 + eiθ|1〉)L, where θ = pi/4, 3pi/4, 5pi/4, 7pi/4, Alice applies fault-tolerant (TH)L,
(TSH)L, (TZH)L, and (TS†H)L to the |0〉L state. On average, Alice uses 10.5 T gates,
239 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 56.25 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 35.5 mea-
surements in preparing each encoded logical qubit. Alice also needs to operate at least
22 physical qubits because a fault-tolerant T gate requires at least 15 ancilla qubits.
In our fault-tolerant blind quantum computation, for each brick, Bob will perform 10
fault-tolerant CZ gates, 8 fault-tolerant phase shift, 8 fault-tolerant Hadamard gates,
and 8 fault-tolerant measurements in the computational basis. Bob has to do eight
different fault-tolerant phase shift, which are implemented by IL, TL, SL, (TS)L, ZL,
(TZ)L, S†L, and (TS
†)L. On average, a phase shift requires 10.5 T gates, 131 two-qubit
Clifford-group gates, 30.25 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 17.5 measurements.
Fault-tolerantly measuring an encoded logical qubit in the computational basis re-
quires 42 CNOT gates, 4 Hadamard gates, and 11 measurements. Thus, for each brick,
Bob has to perform 84 T gates, 1454 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 330 one-qubit
Clifford-group gates, and 228 measurements. For each half-brick, Bob has to perform
42 T gates, 720 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 165 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and
114 measurements.
Here we will calculate the resource consumption of performing a 10-bit QCLA adder
on blind quantum computation. First, we know the decomposed circuit of a 10-bit
QCLA adder consists of 441 T/T † gates, 413 CNOT gates, and 144 one-qubit Clif-
ford group gates, and it has 35 input qubits. Second, we added 328 swap gates to the
circuit to make CNOT gates operate on adjacent qubits. Third, after arranging quan-
tum gates to bricks with hand-optimization, we need 612 layers of bricks. Since it has
35 input qubits, we need a brickwork state with 35 rows. Thus, the totoal number of
qubits in this brickwork state is (1+612×4)×35 = 85, 715. The brickwork state consists
of 10,404 bricks and 612 half-bricks.
In the BFK basic blind quantum computation, Alice needs a special qubit generator,
and she has to prepare 85,715 qubits with random phase. For each brick, Bob has to
perform 10 entanglements, 8 phase shift, 8 Hadamard gates and 8 measurements in
the computational basis. For each half-brick, Bob has to perform 4 entanglements, 4
phase shift, 4 Hadamard gates and 4 measurement in the computational basis. Thus,
Bob has to perform 42,840 T gates, 106,488 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 149,940
one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 85,680 measurements. In our first fault-tolerant
protocol, Alice needs a small quantum computer which consists of at least 22 qubits.
She has to perform about 900,007.5 T gates, 20,485,885 two-qubit Clifford-group gates,
4,821,468.75 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 3,042,882.5 measurements in prepar-
ing encoded logical qubits. Bob has to perform about 899,640 T gates, 15,568,056 two-
qubit Clifford-group gates, 3,534,300 one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 2,441,880
measurements. In our BSA fault-tolerant protocol, Alice needs a buffer of at most 56
qubits and she does no quantum computation except receiving and sending qubits and
running quantum error correction locally. Bob has to perform about 7,200,060 T gates,
163,887,080 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 38,571,750 one-qubit Clifford-group gates,
and 24,343,060 measurements in preparing encoded logical qubits. Bob also has to
perform about 899,640 T gates, 15,568,056 two-qubit Clifford-group gates, 3,534,300
one-qubit Clifford-group gates, and 2,441,880 measurements for blind quantum com-
putation.
Three tables show the comparison of resource consumption of performing a 10-bit
QCLA adder using our fault-tolerant protocol. In the BFK basic protocol, compared
to the target circuit, a 10-bit QCLA adder requires Bob more than 97 times as many
quantum gates, and Alice has to prepare 85,715 qubits. Compared to the fault-tolerant
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Table I. Resource consumption compared to the target circuit
T gates 2-qubit gates 1-qubit gates
FT circuit 21x 287x 160x
BFK basic BQC 97x 258x 1041x
Our 1st FT BQC (Bob) 2,040x 37,695x 24,544x
Our 1st FT BQC (Alice) 2,041x 49,603x 33,482x
Our BSA (Bob only) 18,367x 434,516x 292,403x
Table II. Resource consumption compared to the fault-tolerant target circuit
T gates 2-qubit gates 1-qubit gates measurements
Our 1st FT BQC (Bob) 97x 131x 153x 158x
Our 1st FT BQC (Alice) 97x 173x 209x 197x
Our BSA (Bob only) 875x 1,515x 1,826x 1,735x
Table III. Resource consumption compared to the BFK non-fault-tolerant BQC
T gates 2-qubit gates 1-qubit gates measurements
Our 1st FT BQC (Bob) 21x 146x 24x 29x
Our 1st FT BQC (Alice) 21x 192x 32x 36x
Our BSA (Bob only) 189x 1,685x 281x 313x
quantum circuit of a 10-bit QCLA adder using 260 qubits, our first fault-tolerant pro-
tocol makes Alice perform more than 97 times as many quantum gates, but she needs
only a small 22-qubit quantum computer. Compared to our first fault-tolerant protocol,
our BSA protocol reduce the quantum computation overhead of Alice and requires Bob
to execute 9 times more quantum gates.
6. CONCLUSIONS
We propose two fault-tolerant blind quantum computation protocol which applies
quantum error correction underneath the blind quantum computation. The first fault-
tolerant protocol has two advantages. First, it provides more fault-tolerance. Second,
the client prepares fewer qubits. However, the trade-off of the protocol is that the client
needs a small quantum computer. Because of that, the client may leak some informa-
tion which can be exploited by a side-channel attack. The second fault-tolerant protocol
requires the client to do no quantum computation while preserving the two advan-
tages of the first protocol. Thus, the side-channel attack that works against the first
protocol does not work against this protocol. The second protocol has three trade-offs.
First, the client has to buffer eight encoded logical qubits. Second, the server has to
do more quantum computation. Third, this protocol uses more bandwidth of the quan-
tum channel. As long as the server has enough quantum computation power and the
quantum channel provides enough bandwidth, the client is required only to receive,
buffer, and send qubits. We also provide a simple analysis on the resource consump-
tion of fault-tolerant blind quantum computation. Compared to the BFK basic blind
quantum computation, the overhead of our fault-tolerant blind quantum computation
is increased by a constant factor.
Our work can be further extended in the following ways. First, the idea of making
the server prepare encoded logical qubits can be applied to some other blind quantum
computation protocols, for example, the blind topological measurement-based quan-
tum computation [Morimae and Fujii 2012]. Second, the optimization of quantum cir-
cuit for blind quantum computation is an important issue because the client’s over-
head is proportional to the size of the brickwork state. Third, quantum resources used
in transmitting qubit via quantum teleportation should be considered because that is
also a non-negligible overhead.
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